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Abstract: This paper examines the causes of herd behavior in the Chinese stock 
market. Using the non-linear model of Chang, Cheng and Khorana (2000), we find 
robust evidence of herding in both the up and down markets. We contribute to the 
existing literature by exploring the underlying reasons for herding in China. It is 
shown that analyst recommendation, short-term investor horizon, and risk are the 
principal causes of herding. However, we cannot find evidence that relates herding to 
firm size, nor can we detect significant differences in herding between state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) and non-SOEs. 
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1. Introduction 
Herding behavior in stock markets has been the subject of considerable academic 
attention over past two decades. Some studies regard herding as a result of rational 
incentives (Shleifer and Summers 1990, Chari and Kehoe 2004, Calvo and Mendoza 
2000) while others believe that it results from the cognitive bias of investors 
(Devenow and Welch, 1996; Lux, 1995). Herding can be spurious or intentional; the 
former refers to a clustering of investment decisions owing to similar underlying 
information environment, whereas the latter is a situation where investors follow each 
other’s trading decisions regardless of their own beliefs. Herding is more ubiquitous 
in emerging markets. Most extant studies find significant evidence in favor of herding 
in developing countries (Chang et al., 2000; Chiang et al., 2010). However, few 
studies have identified whether certain market micro-structure or stock characteristics 
might foment herding among investors. This paper aims to fill the gap by examining 
the herding behavior in the Chinese stock market with a special focus on the role of 
government intervention, information environment, investor horizon, and the level of 
systematic risk on herding. The case of the Chinese stock market is of interest because 
of its influence as the largest emerging stock market in the world. As of 2012, the 
total market capitalization of the Chinese stock market was over 3,740 billion U.S. 
dollars.  Moreover, the market is unique in that it is dominated in number by 
individual investors who have little professional knowledge and limited access to 
veracious information. As a result, they might be more likely to follow the trading 
decisions of institutional investors – a role that is increasingly important in China. 
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Since 2006, the number of domestic institutional investors in China and the value of 
assets under their management have soared. More recently, an increasing number of 
foreign institutional investors have also initiated investments in the state through the 
qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) scheme.  
Previous academic evidence of herd behavior in China is mixed. While Demirer 
and Kutan (2006) detect no evidence of herd behavior, Tan et al. (2008) find herding 
to be prevalent in both the A-share and the B-share markets. To our best knowledge, 
little effort has been made to investigate (1) the underlying reasons for herding and (2) 
stock characteristics that generate a higher probability of herding. In this paper, we 
will address the aforementioned questions and provide a comprehensive analysis of 
herding behavior in the Chinese stock market. Following the methodology of Chang, 
Cheng and Khorana (2000), we find significant evidence in favor of herding in the 
Chinese A-share market during 2000 and 2011.2 Consistent with the view that market 
participants tend to exhibit herd behavior during market slumps, the evidence of 
herding in our sample is more pronounced in the down market. Subsample analyses 
show that our results are robust.  
In addition, we also uncover the characteristics of stocks that are more likely to be 
herded. Firstly, in contrasts to the conventional view that government intervention is 
an important perpetuator for herding, no significant difference in herding between 
state-owned enterprises (SOE) and non-SOEs is detected. Secondly, it is found that 
                                                 
2If we extend our results from 2000 to the inception of Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, the results do not alter much. The reason for selecting a sample period after 2000 is because 
the information of analyst following is more available after this year. 
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the number of analyst following affects herding. In the subsample where the number 
of analyst following is above the median, we find significant evidence of herding, 
while no herding is detected in other subsamples. Thirdly, firm size and the dispersion 
in the analyst forecast – which are also proxies for information environment – are not 
important sources of herding. In subsamples partitioned by size and forecast 
dispersion, significant evidence of herding is detected. In addition, we also investigate 
the influence of speculative investors on herding. Speculation is proxied by daily 
turnover rate, which is measured by the trading volume scaled by shares outstanding. 
Interestingly, we find that stocks in the subsample with highest daily turnover exhibit 
significant evidence of herding, which is consistent with the view that speculation 
contributes to herd behavior. Finally, we find evidence that herding is more 
pronounced in risky stocks.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the herding 
literature. In Section 3, we provide the methodological details and data description. 
Section 4 and 5 present the empirical results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Related Literature 
There exists exhaustive literature on the topic of herding. One scholarly camp 
argues that herding arises from investors’ psychological bias. For example, Devenow 
and Welch (1996) and Lux (1995) argue that herding occurs when investors suppress 
their prior beliefs and blindly follow others’ trading strategies. Another strand of the 
literature contends that herding can also occur among rational market participants. An 
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information-related herding theory states that the actions of informed traders might 
reveal inside information, which induces outsiders to follow informed traders’ 
investment strategy (Shleifer and Summers 1990, Chari and Kehoe 2004, Calvo and 
Mendoza 2000). Moreover, the principal-agent problem in the asset management 
industry might also cause herding. As suggested by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and 
Rajan (1994), fund managers of institutional investors care about their performance 
relative to their peers, hence they have incentive to infer the information content from 
their peers’ investment strategies and mimic those strategies. In this way, they will 
perform on par with their counterparts in other mutual funds. Consequently, the 
rational behavior of fund managers leads to a seemingly irrational market 
phenomenon of herding. 
A variety of empirical methodologies have been employed to examine herd 
behavior. Christie and Huang (1995), for instance, study cross-sectional standard 
deviations in the U.S. equity market. The underlying intuition behind their method is 
that if market participants suppress their own predictions about asset prices during 
periods of large market movements and base their investment decisions only on 
market consensus, individual asset returns will not diverge substantially from the 
overall market return. However, rational asset pricing model would predict the 
dispersion of individual stock returns to increase with market return. Thus, during 
large market swings, a reduction of cross-sectional standard deviations leads to the 
existence of herd behavior. The results of Christie and Huang (1995) do not suggest 
evidence of herding in the U.S. stock market.  
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Chang, Cheng and Khorana (2000) propose a variant of the methodology used by 
Christie and Huang (1995). They calculate cross-sectional absolute deviation (CSAD) 
of stock returns, which is less subject to the influence of outliers than cross-sectional 
standard deviation (CSSD) of stock returns. The implication from a rational asset 
pricing model indicates that there is a linear and positive relation between CSAD and 
market return. The evidence that CSAD increases (decreases) with market return with 
a decreasing (increasing) speed lends support to herd behavior. Chang, Cheng and 
Khorana (2000) document significant evidence of herding in the stock markets of 
South Korea and Taiwan. Partial evidence of herding in the Japanese stock market is 
also found, but no evidence of herding is found in the U.S. or Hong Kong market. 
Hwang and Salmon (2004) employ a different testing methodology based on cross-
sectional variability of factor sensitivities. Their study confirms that herd activities 
exist in South Korea. Lin and Swanson (2003) find no evidence that foreign investors 
herd in the Taiwanese market using the cross-sectional standard deviation based 
methodology. Zhou and Lai (2009) discover that herd behavior in Hong Kong tends to 
be more prevalent in small stocks and that investors are more likely to herd when 
selling rather than buying stocks. Chiang and Zheng (2010) examine daily return data 
for 18 countries and document herd behavior of stock markets in developed countries 
(except in the U.S.) and developing countries alike.3  
                                                 
3 Apart from stock markets, Gleason, Lee and Mathur (2003) study herd behavior in European futures 
markets, and Gleason, Mathur and Peterson (2004) conduct an detailed analysis on the intraday herd 
behavior of the ETF market. 
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3. Methodology and Data 
We use a simple framework, following Chang et al. (2000), to explain why our 
empirical method can capture herd behaviors. In a rational market without any friction, 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) indicates that the expected return of individual 
stock can be expressed as follows: 
ܧሺܴ௜௧ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௜ܧሺܴ௠௧ െ ߚ଴ሻ, 
where ܴ௜ is the individual stock return at day t, ܴ௠௧is the market portfolio return at 
day t, ߚ଴ is the return on the zero-beta portfolio and ߚ௜ is individual stock’s systematic 
risk.  
The absolute value of the deviation of individual stock expected return from market 
return is: 
|ܧሺܴ௜௧ሻ െ ܴ௠௧| ൌ |ߚ௜ െ 1| ∗ |ܧሺܴ௠௧ െ ߚ଴ሻ|, 
where ܧሺܴ௠௧ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ 1 ∗ ܧሺܴ௠௧ െ ߚ଴ሻ. The average cross-sectional absolute value 
of the deviation of all individual stocks (AAVD) is simply  
ܣܣܸܦ௧ ൌ 1ܰ ∗ ∑௜ୀଵ
ே |ܧሺܴ௜௧ሻ െ ܴ௠௧| ൌ 1ܰ ∗ ∑௜ୀଵ
ே |ߚ௜ െ 1| ∗ |ܧሺܴ௠௧ െ ߚ଴ሻ| 
From the above equation, we can see that the average absolute value of deviation is a 
positive and linear function of absolute value of market return. 
߲ܣܣܸܦ௧
߲|ܧሺܴ௠௧ሻ| ൌ
1
ܰ ∗ ∑௜ୀଵ
ே |ߚ௜ െ 1| ൐ 0,										 ߲
ଶܣܣܸܦ௧
߲ܧሺܴ௠௧ሻଶ ൌ 0 
 
Any non-linear relation between AAVD and market return indicates investor 
irrationality or market friction. As a special case of irrational trading behavior, 
investors following a herding trading strategy suppress their belief and follow the 
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market, which decreases individual stock’s deviation from market return. In case of 
volatile market, the herding effect dominates the positive effect arising from rational 
trading strategy, suggesting a negative association between AAVD and ܧሺܴ௠௧ሻ . 
Combing the two effects together, we expect that AAVD first increases and then 
decreases with market return. Hence, we use the negative correlation between AAVD 
and ܧሺܴ௠௧ሻଶ as evidence of herd behavior. 
To empirically test herd behavior in the Chinese stock market, we again follow 
Chang, Cheng and Khorana (2000) and employ a non-linear regression specification 
to examine the relation between the level of equity return dispersion and the overall 
market return. The return dispersion measure is cross-sectional absolute deviation of 
returns (CSAD), which is formulated as: 
 
, ,
1
1 | |
N
t i t m t
i
CSAD R R
N 
 
                                              (1)
 
 
where N is the number of firms in the aggregate market portfolio, ,i tR  is the observed 
stock return for firm i on day t and ,m tR  is the return of market portfolio at time t. The 
CSAD is a proxy for AAVD under the assumption that realized return is a good proxy 
for expected return and it measures the degree to which individual stock return 
deviates from market consensus. 
The rational asset-pricing model implies a linear relation between the dispersion in 
individual asset returns and the market return; dispersion in individual asset returns 
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arises with the absolute value of the market return under normal conditions. However, 
if market participants tend to follow the consensus of the market and trade in the same 
direction during periods of market stress, this herd behavior is likely to increase the 
correlation among asset returns, which leads to a non-linear relation between CSAD 
and market return. Therefore, a testing methodology based on a general quadratic 
relationship between CSAD and market return of the form is proposed as follows: 
 
ܥܵܣܦ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛଵ|ܴ௠௧| ൅ ߛଶሺܴ௠௧ሻଶ ൅ ε୲                               (2)           
 
The non-linear term is captured by γଶ. In the presence of herding, the non-linear 
coefficient 2  will be significantly negative, indicating that in times of a highly 
volatile market, equity return dispersion decreases with the absolute return because 
investors tend to suppress their own opinions and follow others’ trading strategy. In 
addition, it is possible that the degree of herding may be asymmetric in the up and 
down markets. Therefore, the following models for up and down markets respectively 
are estimated: 
 
ܥܵܣܦ௧௎௉ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛଵ௎௉หܴ௠௧௎௉ห ൅ ߛଶሺܴ௠௧௎௉ሻଶ ൅ ߝ௧                       (3) 
 
ܥܵܣܦ௧஽ைௐே ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛଵ஽ைௐேหܴ௠௧஽ைௐேห ൅ ߛଶሺܴ௠௧஽ைௐேሻଶ ൅ ߝ௧             (4) 
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where ܥܵܣܦ௧௎௉(ܥܵܣܦ௧஽ைௐேሻ is the average deviation of individual stock return to 
the market return when the market return is positive (negative). 
The stock price data of the entire population of A-share firms and market return 
data of the Shenzhen and Shanghai market are obtained from the China Stock Market 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Daily returns are examined. The sample 
period ranges from January 2000 to December 2011. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The summary statistics are reported in Table 1. The time series average value 
weighted market return over the whole sample period is 0.0%, with a standard 
deviation of 1.8%, ranging from -9.1% to 9.9%. As for CSAD, the mean is 1.7% and 
its standard deviation is 0.6%, which is similar to the statistics in Tan et al. (2008). 
Figure 1 depicts the time series pattern of CSAD. Note that large investor dispersion 
mostly occurs in 2007 and 2008.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Nonlinearity in return dispersions and market return 
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the following model: 
 
ܥܵܣܦ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛଵ|ܴ௠௧| ൅ ߛଶሺܴ௠௧ሻଶ ൅ ߝ௧                             (5) 
 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The model is also estimated separately for subsamples in the up and down markets. 
To make a direct comparison of the coefficients of the linear term in the up and down 
markets, the absolute value – instead of the raw value – of equally weighted market 
return is used in the model estimation. The intercept term represents the average level 
of equity dispersions when the market return is zero and is 1.37% for the whole 
sample. Compared to the down market, where the intercept is also 1.37%, the 
estimated value of the intercept term in the up market is 1.39%. The difference is not 
significant.  
The coefficients of the absolute market return ( 1 ) are significantly positive in the 
whole sample regression as well as the up or down market regressions. This is 
consistent with the prediction of CAPM, which states that return dispersions increase 
linearly with absolute market return, discussed briefly in Section 3. The rate of 
increase is 0.23 and 0.34 in the up market and down market, respectively. Consistent 
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to the findings of McQueen et al. (1996), the stock market in China reacts faster to 
bad news than good news. As a result, the average of CSAD is larger in good times 
due to the asymmetric reaction to good and bad news. 
More importantly, the non-linear term coefficients ( 2 ) are negative and significant 
in all three regressions, providing indirect evidence for herd behavior in the Chinese 
stock market. As discussed in Section 3, a negative correlation between CSAD and 
quartic term of market return suggests that individual investors suppress their own 
belief and follow the market, which in turn leads to cross-sectional dispersion reacts 
to absolute market return at a decreasing rate. Our evidence is consistent with that of 
Chiang and Zheng (2010), who also document evidence of herding in both the up 
market and down market. However, we do not know whether herding is more 
prevalent when market is booming or slumping because the non-linear term 
coefficients are of similar magnitude and significance in both up and down markets.  
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
To gain a vivid picture of the relation between CSAD and market return, we depict 
the estimation results in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows a hump-shaped relation between 
CSAD and market return. The turning point for the up market is 4.65% while it is 5.09% 
for the down market. The speed of increase (decrease) before (after) reaching the 
turning point is also faster in the up market than that in the down market. In other 
 13
words, investors show a lower threshold to suppress their own opinions in the up 
market. Note that in the presence of herding, the relative degree of herding is larger in 
the up market. However, such difference is not significant. 
4.2 Robustness Check 
As shown in Figure 1, the stock return dispersion is more volatile and relatively 
large during 2007, when the stock market experiences a dramatic boom followed by a 
rapid slump. To investigate whether herd behavior is still prevalent in such extreme 
market conditions, we examine the herd behavior during October 2007 and October 
2008. 4  In October of 2007, the A-share market reached its peak with Shanghai 
Composite Index of 6124 and an average price-earnings ratio of 50. However, after 
that the stock market started to fall swiftly, plummeting towards the bottom around 
October 2008, where the Shanghai Composite Index was 1664. This period is 
therefore widely accepted as an A-share stock market crisis. It is intriguing whether 
investors will change their behavior in times of crises. 
The model specification is the same as before. The results are reported in Panel B 
of Table 2. In Column 1, we report the estimation results in the crisis period, October 
2007 to October 2008. The coefficient of the squared market return ( 2 ) is negative 
and significant, which indicates the presence of herd behavior in the crisis period. 
Furthermore, we also investigate the herd behavior in our sample period separate from 
the crisis period. The results are reported in Column 2 and Column 3. Our results 
show that herd behavior is still present before October 2007 and after 2008. It should 
                                                 
4 When we extend the crisis period to September 2007 till November 2008, the results still hold. 
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be noted that the coefficient of the squared market return ( 2 ) is larger in the crisis 
period than the normal period. This parallels Chiang and Zheng’s (2010) assertion that 
financial crisis, to some extent, contributes to the intensification of herd behavior. 
 
5. Determinants of Herding 
Apart from testing the presence of herd behavior in the market, it is also important 
to explore the causes behind herd behavior. In this paper, we will consider market 
microstructure and firm characteristics as possible triggers or enablers of herd 
behavior. The four factors we examine here are government intervention, 
informational environment, speculation, and risk.  
5.1 Government Intervention 
Firstly, we identify government intervention as a probable cause of herding, 
especially as the Chinese stock market is highly regulated. A number of regulations, 
such as IPO or SEO verification, enable the regulatory authority to keep the capital 
market under tight control. Moreover, more than half of the listed firms are state-
owned enterprises (SOE). These enterprises must report to the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and follow strict government 
guidelines in their operation. Hence, government policies and regulatory measures can 
easily distort investor sentiment in China. To analyze the impact of governmental 
intervention on herd behavior, we examine whether herding is more pronounced in 
SOEs. We define whether or not a listed firm is a SOE based on the ultimate 
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controlling shareholder. If the ultimate controlling shareholder is the central 
government or the local government or public institutions, the firm is considered a 
SOE. We obtain the shareholder information from CSMAR, merging our daily stock 
return with the annual ownership information. CSAD based on SOEs and non-SOEs 
is calculated using the same formula defined above; we then use the same model 
specification to detect herd behavior in SOEs and non-SOEs, respectively. The results 
are reported in Table 3.  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Observe from Table 3 that the coefficients of non-linear term of market return are 
always significantly negative. The magnitudes are also similar: -0.0191 and -0.0187 
for SOEs and non-SOEs, respectively. Both are significant at the 1% level. Even if we 
vary the non-linear effect in the up and down markets, we still cannot find any 
significant difference between SOEs and non-SOEs in the non-linear term, regardless 
of market conditions. Hence, we cannot conclude that government intervention gives 
rise to herd behavior. 
5.2 Information Environment 
In this subsection, we investigate how the information environment affects herd 
behavior. The paucity of reliable and timely information, upon which decisions by the 
investor are made, is one of the primary reasons for herd behavior. Without a credible 
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information source, investors generally follow market trends as a basis for their 
investment decisions. As suggested by the Kyle Model (Kyle, 1985), a large number 
of buy orders is indicative of good market sentiment whereas a larger number of sell 
orders is a signal of bad news. If there is complete information, then investors are able 
to make their own judgments about investment portfolios. However, when 
information environment is opaque, the best strategy is for investors to infer true 
information from their counterparts or simply follow others, leading to rampant herd 
behavior in the market. Moreover, the principal-agent problem between fund 
managers and shareholders in the asset management industry also intensifies herding. 
As suggested in Scharfstein and Stein (1990), fund managers might mimic investment 
strategy from their peers. Hence, we conjecture that the scarcity of reliable 
information foments herd behavior even for institutional investors. 
To study the effect of information environment, we use the following proxies: the 
number of analyst following, analyst forecast dispersion, and firm size. Analysts help 
disseminate firm-specific information in a more timely and efficient manner. 
Therefore, the presence of analysts should enhance market efficiency and reduce herd 
behavior. However, some “star analysts” have a larger number of followers and thus 
capable of generating herd behavior among investors. When investors follow analysts’ 
recommendation indiscriminately, herd behavior becomes observable regardless of 
the quality of the information. 
  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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Panel A of Table 4 presents the non-linear effect of market return on stock return 
dispersion across firms with different numbers of analyst following. The analyst data 
starts from 2003; before 2003, most firms did not have analyst following. We rank the 
number of analyst following for each industry every year and form four portfolios 
accordingly. We calculate CSAD for each portfolio and estimate Model 1, 
respectively. Column 1 represents the results for firms whose number of analysts is 
the least compared to their peers within the same one-digit CSRC industry. Column 2 
till Column 4 represent the other three quarters respectively.  
Observe from Panel A that for portfolios with few analysts following, no 
significant evidence of herding is found. The coefficients of non-linear term in the 
first two columns are insignificant. For portfolios with a larger number of analyst 
following (Column 3 and Column 4), herd behavior is detected since the coefficient 
on the quadratic term is significantly negative. Therefore, the very existence of 
analysts results in herd behavior in China, as investors tend to suppress their own 
opinions for stocks that are heavily followed by analysts. 
Similarly, for each firm, we calculate the dispersion among analysts in their 
earnings forecast each year. In related literature, analyst forecast dispersion is a 
widely used proxy for the information environment. We investigate the likelihood of 
stocks becoming target of herding based on the degree to which they display a large 
analyst forecast. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 4. Surprisingly, it is 
observed that herding is prevalent across four quantiles, suggesting that the degree of 
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analyst disagreement towards the earnings is not an important source of herding, but 
the extent to which analyst follow the stock, that induce investors to herd. 
We also examine the possible effect of firm size on herding behavior. One may 
predict that herding behavior occurs less in large firms, as they tend to be more 
information transparent compared to that of smaller firms. However, as reported in 
Panel B, no difference of herding behavior can be found for portfolios of different 
firm sizes; in other words, the degrees of herding behavior is similar for large and 
small firms.  
 
5.3 Speculation 
There is little doubt that speculation is a prominent catalyst for herding behavior. 
However, it is impossible to determine whether a particular investor is rational or 
speculative or whether speculation relates to psychological bias or strategic move. In 
this paper, we focus on one particular aspect of speculation, namely the short-term 
investor horizon. As pointed out by Froot et al. (1992), myopic investors might herd 
on limited information; thus, the short-term investor horizon might lead to herd 
behavior.  
We measure speculative behavior using daily turnover or the total trading volume 
scaled by total tradable shares outstanding. A higher turnover implies a relatively 
shorter investor horizon. For each trading day, we rank all stocks according to their 
turnover values and form four corresponding portfolios. We then estimate Model 1 for 
each portfolio. The results are reported in Table 5. Consistent with our expectation, 
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herd behavior is found in portfolios with the highest turnovers, as the coefficient on 
the quadratic term is significantly negative. Apart from the highest turnover portfolio, 
no herd behavior is detected in other portfolios. 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.4 Systematic Risk and Stock Synchronicity 
Finally, we examine the influence of risk on herd behavior. Investors, individual or 
institutional, tend to seek advice from others in face of market uncertainty. Shiller and 
Pound (1989) document that institutional investors are more likely to listen to other 
professionals’ advice when facing riskier investments. To the extent that institutional 
investors herd on others’ information, such herding would be more profound in stocks 
with higher risk. We measure risk in terms of systematic risk (beta from the market 
model ܴ௜௧ െ ௙ܴ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺܴ௠௧ െ ௙ܴ௧ሻ ൅ ߳௜௧), and stock synchronicity (R2 from the 
market model). In a similar fashion, we form four portfolios based on systematic risk 
or stock synchronicity and estimate Model 1 for each portfolio. The results are 
reported in Table 6.  
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 6 shows that herd behavior mainly exists in portfolios with higher systematic 
risk and stock synchronicity. In Panel A, when systematic risk is small, the coefficient 
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on non-linear term is either insignificant or marginally significant. However, when 
systematic risk is high, the coefficient of the non-linear term is highly significant. 
Similarly, one can find in Panel B that portfolios of stocks with high synchronicity 
show sign of herding. Therefore, herding is not prevalent for Chinese stocks with high 
idiosyncratic risk but more prevailing for stocks with high systemic.  
6. Conclusion 
Despite the growing importance of the Chinese stock market, the existence and 
cause of herd behavior in this market has yet to be fully elucidated. In this study, we 
investigate herd behavior in the Chinese stock market following the methodology 
proposed by Chang, Cheng and Khorana (2000). A non-linear regression specification 
of CSAD and market return is employed to examine the herd behavior in the Chinese 
A-share market. In the absence of herd behavior, classic asset pricing theory (CAPM) 
predicts that CSAD is a linear function of absolute value of market return. Any non-
linear relation between CSAD and market return is evidence of deviation from CAPM. 
Particularly, when investors suppress their own belief and follow the market 
sentiment, we should find a negative correlation between cross-sectional absolute 
deviation of individual stock returns from market return and non-linear term of market 
return. 
 Indeed, we find significant evidence of the presence of herd behavior over the 
whole sample period and the extreme market condition in October 2007 and October 
2008. Furthermore, we have examined the effects of governmental intervention, 
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informational environment, speculation, and systematic risk on herding. It is found 
that analysts following would lead to herding, and that herd behavior is mostly 
concentrated in firms with high turnover ratio or high systematic risks. However, we 
cannot find evidence that relates herding to firm size, and no noticeable difference in 
herding between state-owned enterprises (SOE) and non-SOEs is detected.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics  
This table reports the descriptive statistics of market return and proxies for herding. The sample 
is all A share stocks in China during 2000 and 2011. ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ_ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊ is the value-weighted 
market return. ܥܵܣܦ is defined in Section 3. ܵݐܽݐ݁ is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
listed firm’s ultimate owner is the governance. ܤ݁ݐܽ is the coefficient on market model from the 
30-day rolling window estimation of the market model. ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐ  is the number of analyst 
following. ܦ݅ݏ݌݁ݎݏ݅݋݊ is the standard deviation of analyst earnings forecast. ܵ݅ݖ݁ the market 
capitalization. Turnover is ratio of trading volume to total tradable shares outstanding. 
 
Panel A: Whole Sample Statistics       
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Market_Return 0.0 1.8 -9.1 9.9 
CSAD 1.7 0.6 0.4 6.0 
State 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Beta 1.1 0.3 -4.7 10.7 
Analyst 4.5 8.1 0.0 79.0 
Dispersion 0.0 0.0 -1.2 0.0 
Size 4168110.0 27900000.0 23130.0 2060000000.0 
Turnover 24.7 34.5 0.0 2686.6 
Panel B: Subsample Split by Government Intervention 
SOE 1.6984 0.5966 0.3859 6.1064 
non-SOE 1.6938 0.6628 0.4219 8.5203 
Panel C: Subsample Split by Information Environment 
Macro-Information Environment 
Low Beta 1.6779 0.7030 0.5750 9.3747 
High Beta 1.7788 0.7337 0.2007 8.9691 
Firm-specific Information Environment 
Few Analysts 1.7970 0.7661 0.6473 18.5991 
More Analysts 1.7074 0.5933 0.6057 5.2141 
More Dispersion 1.6563 0.6079 0.2041 8.6875 
Less Dispersion 1.8314 0.7688 0.5488 10.0786 
Small Size 1.7541 0.7345 0.4992 9.1110 
Large Size 1.5577 0.7238 0.1201 21.6996 
Panel D: Subsample Split by Speculation
Low Turnover 1.1770 0.6915 0.3450 8.5775 
High Turnover 2.9181 1.5319 0.3260 43.1503 
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Table 2: Regression Result 
Panel A presents the regression results (All A shares) for ܥܵܣܦ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛଵ|ܴ௠௧| ൅
ߛଶܴ௠௧ଶ ൅ ߝ௧ for upper market and down market respectively. Panel B examines the 
effect of extreme market condition on herding. From 2007 October to 2008 October, 
the Chinese stock market drops dramatically. The Newey-West (Newey and West, 
1987) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A: Whole Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full Sample  Up Market Down Market 
    
|Rmt| 0.2933*** 0.2323*** 0.3361*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.033) 
R2mt -0.0253*** -0.0285*** -0.0200*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
Constant 1.3692*** 1.3907*** 1.3665*** 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.035) 
    
Observations 2,901 1,568 1,333 
Panel B: Crisis Period 
 
VARIABLES 
Oct 2007-
Oct2008 
Jan2000-
Sep2007 
Oct2008-Dec2011 
    
|Rmt| 0.1513*** 0.2780*** 0.1961*** 
 (0.056) (0.042) (0.032) 
R2mt -0.0201*** -0.0163** -0.0167*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) 
Constant 2.0913*** 1.3919*** 1.6504*** 
 (0.091) (0.045) (0.038) 
    
Observations 261 1,149 1,036 
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Table 3: Regression Result (Subsample Split by State Ownership) 
This table presents the regression results (All A shares) for ܥܵܣܦ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛଵ|ܴ௠௧| ൅
ߛଶܴ௠௧ଶ ൅ ߝ௧  for upper market and down market respectively. In Panel A, the 
dependent variable CSAD is calculated by SOE firms while in Panel B it is calculated 
based on Non-SOE firms. The Newey-West heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A  SOE    
VARIABLES SOE 
Full Sample 
SOE 
Up Market 
SOE 
Down Market 
    
|Rmt| 0.2475*** 0.1738*** 0.2991*** 
 (0.025) (0.035) (0.035) 
R2mt -0.0191*** -0.0229*** -0.0140** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 
Constant 1.4463*** 1.4656*** 1.4574*** 
 (0.030) (0.035) (0.040) 
    
Observations 2,185 1,187 998 
Panel B: Non 
SOE 
   
VARIABLES NonSOE 
Full Sample 
NonSOE 
Up Market 
NonSOE 
Down Market 
|Rmt| 0.2470*** 0.1818*** 0.2947*** 
 (0.026) (0.037) (0.037) 
R2mt -0.0187*** -0.0241*** -0.0131** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 1.5513*** 1.5574*** 1.5748*** 
 (0.032) (0.036) (0.042) 
Observations 2,185 1,187 998 
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Table 4: Regression Result (Subsample Split by Information Environment) 
This table presents the regression results (All A shares) for ܥܵܣܦ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛଵ|ܴ௠௧| ൅
ߛଶܴ௠௧ଶ ൅ ߝ௧  for four portfolios formed by three different proxies of information 
environment. Panel A reports the results for subsample split by the number of analysts 
following the individual stock. In Panel B and Panel C, the whole sample is 
partitioned by analysts forecast dispersion and firm market capitalization. The analyst 
forecast starts from 2003 as few stocks have been followed by analysts before 2003. 
The Newey-West heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Panel A: Number of Analysts Following 
 Quantile1 Quantile2 Quantile3 Quantile4 
     
|Rmt| 0.1752*** 0.1177*** 0.1999*** 0.2426*** 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.029) (0.029) 
R2mt -0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0096* -0.0174*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 1.5822*** 1.7841*** 1.5117*** 1.4624*** 
 (0.037) (0.042) (0.032) (0.031) 
     
Observations 2,185 2,185 2,185 2,185 
Panel B: Analyst Dispersion 
 
VARIABLES Quantile1 Quantile2 Quantile3 Quantile4 
     
|Rmt| 0.2106*** 0.1965*** 0.2186*** 0.2402*** 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.036) 
R2mt -0.0106* -0.0101* -0.0136** -0.0141** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Constant 1.4187*** 1.4598*** 1.4496*** 1.5755*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.038) 
     
Observations 2,185 2,185 2,185 2,185 
Panel C: Firm Size 
 
VARIABLES Quantile1 Quantile2 Quantile3 Quantile4 
     
|Rmt| 0.2187*** 0.2247*** 0.2203*** 0.2737*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) 
R2mt -0.0119** -0.0104* -0.0103* -0.0186*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Constant 1.5112*** 1.4219*** 1.3781*** 1.2716*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) 
     
Observations 2,901 2,901 2,901 2,901 
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Table 5: Regression Result (Subsample Split by Speculation) 
This table presents the regression results (All A shares) for ܥܵܣܦ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛଵ|ܴ௠௧| ൅
ߛଶܴ௠௧ଶ ൅ ߝ௧ for four portfolios formed based on investor speculation. Speculation is 
proxied by turnover ratio, which is measured by each stock’s trading volume scaled 
by total tradable shares outstanding. The Newey-West heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Quantile1 Quantile2 Quantile3 Quantile4 
     
|Rmt| 0.2513*** 0.1903*** 0.1881*** 0.2212*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.030) (0.052) 
R2mt -0.0023 -0.0054 -0.0088 -0.0207* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) 
Constant 0.8708*** 1.0793*** 1.4649*** 2.6824*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.050) 
     
Observations 2,901 2,901 2,901 2,901 
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Table 6: Regression Result (Subsample Split by Risk and Synchronicity) 
This table presents the regression results (All A shares) for ܥܵܣܦ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛଵ|ܴ௠௧| ൅
ߛଶܴ௠௧ଶ ൅ ߝ௧  for four portfolios formed based on systematic risk and stock 
synchronicity. Systematic risk is measured by beta from the 30-day rolling regression 
ܴ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ଴ܴ௠௧ ൅ ߳௜௧. In Panel B, the whole sample is split based on synchronicity, 
which is measured by R2 from the market model. The Newey-West heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Panel A: Systematic Risk Proxied by Beta of Market Return 
 
VARIABLES Quantile1 Quantile2 Quantile3 Quantile4 
     
|Rmt| 0.2453*** 0.1911*** 0.2114*** 0.2884*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) 
R2mt -0.0090* -0.0091 -0.0108* -0.0225*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 1.4036*** 1.3373*** 1.3383*** 1.5009*** 
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) 
     
Observations 2,901 2,901 2,901 2,901 
Panel B: Synchronicity Estimated from Market Model 
 
VARIABLES Quantile1 Quantile2 Quantile3 Quantile4 
     
|Rmt| 0.2480*** 0.2552*** 0.2358*** 0.2013*** 
 (0.032) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) 
R2mt -0.0087 -0.0171*** -0.0155*** -0.0102** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Constant 1.7578*** 1.4357*** 1.2799*** 1.1133*** 
 (0.034) (0.028) (0.027) (0.024) 
     
Observations 2,901 2,901 2,901 2,901 
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Figure 1 CSAD over the sample period 
This figure depicts the CSAD over the sample period. CSAD is defined in Section 2. 
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Figure 2 Herding in the Up or Down Market 
This figure depicts the relation between CSAD and market return in the up market and 
down market respectively. The parameters are based on regression results reported in 
Table 2. The horizontal axis is the market return and vertical axis represents CSAD. 
 
 
